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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction lies in this Court for appeal

from the decision 0f a

district

judge pursuant t0

Idaho Appellate Rule 11.
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INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 0F THE CASE

This

is

a Personal Injury Case ﬁled in the Seventh Judicial District 0f Idaho, County of

Bonneville. Plaintiff, Linda Black, has alleged that she sustained injuries after a defective

electro—therapy

pad caused severe and unusual burns. Defendants ﬁled a motion

judgment on the grounds
judgment stage and

that Plaintiff could not

that Bart

McDonald was not qualiﬁed

not the electro—therapy pads were defective.
Plaintiff has

ﬁled

this

prove her prima facie case

The

District

to testify as

at the

for

summary

summary

an expert as t0 Whether 0r

Court granted Defendants’ motion and

Brief on appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court erred bv construing

facts in a light

most favorable

This portion of Appellant’s Brief discusses the
before

The

it

C01_1rt

in light

moving partv.

district court’s errors in

Viewing the facts

of the moving party when the moving party presented no

This portion of Appellant’s Brief discusses the
testimony 0f Bart McDonald.
in refusing t0

facts.

McDonald

erred in excluding the testimonv 0f Bart

The Court erred

to the

district court’s errors in

excluding the

3.

applv the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur t0 Appellant’s case.

This portion of Appelant’s Brief discusses the errors of district court in ﬁnding that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must be please as a cause of action and did not apply to Appellant’s
case.

The Court erred bV making a ﬁnding

summagx

that Plaintiff could not prove a prima facie case 0n

judgment.

This portion 0f Appellant’s brief discusses the

on summary judgment

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief

that Plaintiff cannot

distn'ct court’s errors in

making a ﬁnding

prove a primafacie case.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about December 21,

2.

Her therapy involved the use of electro-therapy pads manufactured and sold by

2015, Plaintiff received therapy

at

Superior Physical Therapy.

Defendants.

McDonald administered the

3.

Bart

4.

During the course of the therapy, Bart McDonald noticed a white spot on the right side of
Plaintiffs lower back,

5.

Plaintiff was

which he suspected was an

unconcerned

and inﬂamed, causing her
to seek

6.

The
the

7.

to return to Superior Physical

pad was assigned a

incident

pad was thrown

lot

number and pads from

at 141,

in the

Therapy Where she was advised

12-13.

at 141,

same defects When used. R.

The

electrical burn. R. at 141, Para. 12.

time of injury, but two hours later the burn became red

at the

medical attention. R.

defective

therapy. R. at 141, Para. 10.

the

same

lot

number showed

7-9.

garbage by accident

at

Bart McDonald’s ofﬁce.

Deposition of Bart McDonald, Pg. 17, L. 8-10.
8.

Bart

McDonald administered the

therapy in a proper manner, following the

manufacturer’ s instructions.

9.

Bart

McDonald

stated in his afﬁdavit that he

knows of no

other rational explanation

Linda Black received burns other than these electrode pads were defective and that
opinion t0 a reasonable degree of medical probability. R.

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief

why

is

his

at 141, Para. 15.

Page 5

ARGUMENT
The Court Applied

1.

summary judgment,

In a motion for

absence of a material

1150 (201

1).

“When

the Incorrect Standards at

fact.

the

Summarv Judgment.

moving party bears

the burden of proving the

Sadid v. Idaho State University, 15 1 Idaho 932, 938, 265 P.3d 1144,

considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there

genuine issue of material

fact,

the

court must liberally construe the facts, and

trial

is

n0

draw

all

reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co.

Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport
If the

moving party has satisﬁed

&

Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679, 685, 365 P.3d 1033,

its

burden, the non-moving party must then

v.

1040 (2016).

come forward with

sufﬁcient admissible evidence identifying speciﬁc facts that demonstrate the existence of a

genuine issue for

P.3d 961, 970 (2010).

drawn

in favor

nonmoving

Wattenbarger

trial.

"[a]11

A. G.

Mackay

v.

Marek v.

facts are liberally

Hecla, Ltd, 161 Idaho 21

Four Rivers Packing

541 (1969)). “Conﬂicting evidentiary

facts,

Banner Life Ins. C0.

v.

1,

construed in the

214, 384 P.3d 975, 978

Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066

moving

841, 846, 216 P.3d 130, 135 (2009) (citing Collard

party.”

Ina, 150 Idaho 308, 317, 246

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be

(2008)). "A11 doubts are t0 be resolved against the

nonmoving

& Sons,

Edwards

of the nonmoving party, and disputed

party's favor."

(2016) (citing

v.

v.

party." Callies

v.

O'Neal, 147 Idaho

Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 795, 451 P.2d 535,

however,[sic] must

still

be Viewed

Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable

in favor

Tr.,

of the

147 Idaho 117,

123-24, 206 P.3d 481, 487-88 (2009). “The burden 0f proving the absence of material facts

upon the moving
burden

party.

shifts t0 the

Once

the

moving party

nonmoving party

challenged element of the claim does

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief

to

show

exist.

is

establishes the absence 0f a genuine issue, the

that a

genuine issue 0f material fact 0n the

Venable

v.

Internet Auto Rent

& Sales,

Ina, 156
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Idaho 574, 581, 329 P.3d 356, 363 (2014) (quoting Hei

v.

Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94,

98 (2003) (internal citations omitted»; Greenwald v. W. Sur. C0., 164 Idaho 929, 942, 436 P.3d
1278, 1291 (2019). Although circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue for

scintilla

fact.

0f evidence

Callies

v.

is

trial,

a mere

insufﬁcient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material

O’Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 846, 216 P.3d 130, 165 (2009). Thus, the slightest doubt

as to the facts Will not forestall

summary judgment. Zimmerman

Volkswagen ofAmerica, Ina,

v.

128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.3d 67, 70 (1996). “Ifthe evidence reveals no disputed issues of
material fact, then only a question of law remains, over

Lapham

v.

Court exercises free review.”

t0 testify that there

was any other reasonable

no evidence by afﬁdavit, and no evidence by deposition. Defense has the burden

summary judgment to show that. They have
and, under Friel, the Court must

draw

all

887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). The Court failed

reasonable inferences and

by granting

the Defense’s

to

at

offered no evidence of any other reasonable source

favor of the non-moving party, the Plaintiff. Friel

party

this

Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002).

The Defense has supplied n0 expeﬁ witness
cause,

Which

do

v.

this.

all

questions 0f evidence in

Boise City Hous. Auth, 126 Idaho 484, 485,
It

drew

all

moving

inferences in favor of the

motion for summary judgment with no showing of proof and

without meeting their burden.

The Court
therapy

correctly stated that “Black

when the same

electrode pads

evidence that cuts against the idea that

were
it

showed no

which

is

that they

worked properly

effects

from those ﬁrst three days of

use[sic]. .,” but incorrectly states that this “.

was

.

the electrode pads themselves that

rather than the use of the electrode pads.” R. at 167.

pads,

ill

The Court

.

.is

were defective

points out the latent defect in the

for three out 0f ten times, but failed

0n the fourth

use.

This shows that the pads failed more than six uses before they should have been discontinued

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief
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and well beyond the expected
further erred

failure threshold in their speciﬁcations. R. at 141.

by misconstruing

this fact in a light

Court had any question as to the evidence

which would show

Plaintiff,

The Court,

in deciding a

standards, as cited above.

how reasonable

that this

is,

it

more favorable

to the

moving

must draw reasonable inferences

The Court

party. If the

of the

in favor

in fact, a latent defect in the pad.

motion for summary judgment, must comport With certain

Those standards include the burdens incumbent upon each

and

party,

inferences are drawn. See generally: Conner, Liberty Bankers Life Ins.

Ca,

Wattenbarger, Marek, Venable, Greenwald, Callies, Zimmerman, and Lapham, supra.
In a motion for

is

upon

burden

the

moving

shifts t0 the

summary judgment, “The burden of proving

patty.

Once

the

moving party

nonmoving party

t0

show

establishes the absence 0f a genuine issue, the

that a genuine issue

challenged element of the claim does exist.” Venable
In

Murphy

v.

at

Union Pac. R.R. Ca, the Court handled a similar

himself in his deposition and afﬁdavit.
plaintiff in

0f material fact 0n the

581.

below had granted summary judgment against a plaintiff due

799 (2002). The

the absence of material facts

his afﬁdavit, created a genuine issue

The court

to the plaintiff contradicting

Murphy v. Union Pac.

Murphy argued that his

issue.

R.R. C0., 138 Idaho 88, 57 P.3d

deposition testimony, in combination With

of material fact regarding causation.

Id.

His deposition

testimony indicated that he believed he stepped in or on something, such as uneven ballast or the

edge of a

tie

around Which ballast was missing. Murphy's afﬁdavit conﬁrmed that he believed he

stepped in one 0f the uneven areas of the

Murphy's deposition testimony showed
whether
ties.

it

was

his misstep onto

Union Paciﬁc

ties

that

and large

Murphy

an insulator or as a

ballast.

did not

result

Union Paciﬁc contended

know What caused him t0

that

fall,

of negligently maintained ballast and

asserted that Murphy's afﬁdavit contradicted his deposition testimony and

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief
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was, therefore, insufﬁcient to create a genuine issue of material fact for

Murphy

causation.

alleged in his veriﬁed complaint that

adequate walking path caused his

fall.

trial

Union Paciﬁc's

His deposition testimony showed

0n the issue of

failure t0 provide

that,

an

while not

completely certain of what he tripped on, he believed that uneven ballast 0r ballast missing from

between the

uneven

ties

ties

caused his

and large

fall.

Murphy's afﬁdavit further indicated that he probably tripped on

ballast rather than

on a permanent track ﬁxture such

as an insulator.

Construing these facts most favorably for Murphy, a reasonable person could ﬁnd that
likely than not that

Murphy's

injury.

Union Paciﬁc's negligence played some

Id

at 92.

“On

part,

the other hand, a reasonable person could

merely speculating about what caused his
negligence played a part in his injury.

and that he cannot show

fall

When

Murphy

v.

slight, in

ﬁnd

that

that

more

producing

Murphy

is

Union Paciﬁc's

reasonable people could reach different

conclusions from the pleadings and evidence in the record,
denied.”

however

it is

summary judgment must be

Union Pac. R.R. Ca, 138 Idaho 88, 91-92, 57 P.3d 799, 802-03 (2002)

citing (Northwest Bec-Corp.,

136 Idaho

at

839, 41 P.3d at 267;

Farm

Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Harris

Credit Bank ofSpokane

v.

Dept. ofHealth

v.

&

Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992))(Emphasis added).

In

a

trial is

Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out

meant

to resolve.

evidence in the record,

that these are exactly the issues that

Where two reasonable people could reach

summary judgment must be

different conclusions

from

denied.

Here, the record shows that Just as in Murphy, two reasonable people could reach
differing conclusions about the

denied by the

same material

facts

and summary judgment should have been

district court.

By misapplying the

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief

standard for

summary judgment,

the lower Court engaged in a
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reversible error and this case

2.

must be remanded

to correct the error.

Testimonv of Bart McDonald

The Court,

in it’s

Memorandum Decision and Order,

record which identiﬁes

of electrodes. .he
.

were defective.

.

is

..”

McDonald

make

[Plaintiff]

McDonald

did not

make any

in his afﬁdavit

was

that “I

know of no

nothing in the

conclusions as to the “design

t0 Plaintiff in this matter.

Mr.

other rational explanation

why

received these burns other than these electrode pads were defective and that

opinion to a reasonable degree 0f medical probability.” Mr.

upon

is

the conclusion that the electrodes in this matter

and manufacturing” of the electrodes, which caused the burns

McDonald’s testimony

“There

as having any expertise in the design and manufacturing

not qualiﬁed to

R. at 165. Mr.

stated that

his education, expertise,

explanation

was

that the

like Plaintiffs, that the

pads were defective in nature. R.

my

McDonald concluded, based

and his experience, that having administered

hundreds of thousands of times Without seeing burns

is

at 141.

this treatment

only remaining

Plaintiff is not obligated to

demonstrate that manufacturing process or the design of the pads were defective in order

show an

injury

from the defective pads. Because 0f the evidence before the Court, there

is

a

material question of fact as to whether the pads’ design or manufacture were the source 0f the

problem and
3.

that is a question

of fact for the Defense t0 prove in

its

defense of the case.

Res ipsa loguitur.
Both Defendants and the Court have incorrectly

theory of recovery. R. at 166. Res ipsa loquitur

is

stated that res ipsa loquitur

loquitur, if applicable t0 the facts

a separate

a standard of evidence, not a separate

theory of recovery and, as such, does not need to be plead in order for

Res ipsa

is

it

to apply.

of a particular case, creates an inference 0f the

breach 0f the duty imposed and replaces direct evidence with a permissive inference of

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief
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negligence. Brizendine

(1976);

v.

Nampa Meridian Irrigation District,

97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80

Harper v. Hoﬂman, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974). Christensen

v.

Potratz, 100

Idaho 352, 355, 597 P.2d 595, 598 (1979).
Plaintiff did not

need

to plead res ipsa loquz'tur as a theory

of recovery in order for the

doctrine t0 apply to this case.

“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that the instrumentality which caused his injury was

under the exclusive control and management of the defendant and that the circumstances

would permit an average layperson
that the plaintiff would not

negligence.” Enriquez

The Court
control.

v.

Idaho Power C0., 152 Idaho 562, 566, 272 P.3d 534, 538 (2012)

an undisputed

Black has not established, and cannot establish exclusive

fact that the electrode

time of the alleged injury.” R.

was

common knowledge and experience,

based upon

have suffered those injuries in the absence of the defendant's

stated that “In this case,

It is

t0 infer,

at 166.

pads were under McDonald’s control

The instrumentality which caused

the defect in the pads and not the pads themselves. R. at 204.

control 0f the electrode pads at the time of the injury, he

was not

at the

Plaintiffs injury

While McDonald was

in control

0f the pads

time that the defect in the electrode pads, which caused the injury, was created.

in

at the

It is

undisputed that Defendants had exclusive control over the manufacture of the electrode pads

and there

is

nothing in the record from which the Court could have drawn an inference that

they were not in exclusive control.

This

is

the reasoning behind lot numbers, as

were

assigned to the package of pads in this case. 21 C.F.R. 801 .3 offers the following deﬁnition

0f a

lot 0r batch:

“Lot 0r batch means one ﬁnished device 0r more that consist of a single

type, model, class, size, composition, or software version that are

essentially the

same conditions and that

Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief

are intended to

manufactured under

have uniform characteristics and

Page
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quality within speciﬁed limits.” 21 C.F.R. 801.3

requires that “[t]he label of a device in package

The Code of Federal Regulations

form

and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or

numbers allow the product
defect

is

discovered

to

be tracked to

at a later time, as

it

its

shall specify

also

name

conspicuously the

The

distributor.” 21 C.F.R. 801 1(a)
.

time and date of manufacture in case a latent

did in this case.

It is

unreasonable and unrealistic t0

require the designer of a product to also manufacture and be the end user of the product.

exclusive control 0f the product during manufacture

manufacturing defect and there

were not

in exclusive control

is

n0 evidence

lot

is

The

the relevant time period as to a

in the record indicating that the Defendants

of the product during

its

manufacture. Defendants have not

offered any expert testimony, 0r any other form 0f admissible evidence

Which

the Court

could have considered, showing that they were not in exclusive control 0f the product during
its

manufacture. Drawing

all factual

inferences in favor of the

nonmoving

party, the

Court

is

required to ﬁnd that Defendants, as the manufacturers, were in exclusive control 0f the
products throughout

its

manufacture.

Defendants were in exclusive control of the electro pad during
Plaintiff has alleged a manufacturing defect.

experience to note

When an

As

its

manufacture and

the Court noted, Bart

McDonald “has

electrode Visually appears abnormal.” R. at 165. Bart

did not notice any abnormality or defect of the electro-therapy pad prior to

The

defect only

became apparent

after the

pad had been used, which

is,

its

more

the

McDonald

use. R. at 204.

likely than not,

a latent defect of the pad resulting from a faulty manufacturing processes. Defendants need
not be in exclusive control of the defective pad from the very beginning of its existence until

its

end, but only during the times in which the defect

“[I]t is also

was

created.

necessary that the cause of the injury point[s] to the defendant's negligence."

Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief
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S.

H. Kress

&

Co.

Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 617, 515 P.2d 561, 564 (1973)

v.

omitted). In other words, "[t]he

mere happening 0f an accident does not dispense with the

requirement that the injured party must
relief is

(citations

make some showing

that the defendant against

whom

sought was in some manner negligent, where there are other probable causes 0f the

100 Idaho

injury." Christensen,

at

355, 597 P.2d at 598. Therefore, t0 proceed under res ipsa

loquitur, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the instrumentality

Which caused

his injury

was

under the exclusive control and management of the defendant and that the circumstances

would permit an average layperson
that the plaintiff would not

negligence. Enriquez

v.

v.

based upon

common knowledge and experience,

have suffered those injuries in the absence of the defendant's

Idaho Power C0., 152 Idaho 562, 566, 272 P.3d 534, 538 (2012).

essential element in the application

in the ordinary course

t0 infer,

of res ipsa Zoquitur

is

An

the conclusion that the occurrence

of things would not happen unless someone had been negligent. Hale

Heninger, 87 Idaho 414, 422, 393 P.2d 718 (1964); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §

328D, comment

c. It is

also necessary that the cause of the injury point t0 the defendant's

negligence. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra,

comments

e, f,

and

g; Prosser, Torts, §

39

(4th ed. 1971).

Plaintiff

showed

that

no other instrumentality could have caused her

“Under Idaho law, an implied warranty may be breached by a
have been discovered during an inspection

at delivery."

injuries.

latent defect that

Millenkamp

v.

28-2-725(2) expressly states

204.

Davisco Foods
v.

Sunrain

Idaho 270, 279, 385 P.3d 448, 457 (2016). Idaho Code Section
that,

of the goods," the breach occurs

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief

at

could not

Intern, Ina, 562 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 2009); Silver Creek Seed, Ltd. Liab. C0.
Varieties, Ltd. Liab. C0., 161

R.

"where a warranty explicitly extends to ﬁlture performance

at the

time of such performance. Idaho Code Section 28-2-

Page 13

725(2).

While a buyer must inspect

patent defects, that

same buyer

is

its

allowed a reasonable time after inspecting and accepting

the goods to discover latent defects. Idaho

Int’l,

Code

§

28-2-608; Millenkamp

v.

Davisco Foods

Ina, 562 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) The electrotherapy pads were impliedly

warranteed t0 perform properly for ten (10) uses before requiring replacement. R.

The pads
to

ﬁnd

contracted-for goods at the time of delivery to

work

failed after only three (3) applications, creating a breach

for ten (10) applications. R. at 204.

have been used

at least ten (10)

threshold, then that

is

times and

of their implied warranty

The pads should show no

if they

at 204.

ill-effects until

they

begin to perform poorly prior to that

proof of a defect in the pads.

The Court mistakenly considered,
“[McDonald] needed a moistened
not have.” R. at 169. Bart

all

admissible evidence in the record, that

between Black’s skin and the pads, Which he did

trained in administering therapy With electro therapy

is

for abnormalities,

instructions. R. at 203-204. In

required to prevent burns

interface

McDonald

them

pads, Visually inspecting

against

and

in reading the

manual and applying

Mr. McDonald’s experience, no moistened interface

When using the

its

is

speciﬁc waveform for treatment used on Linda

Black. R. at 204. In approximately 296,400 other administrations 0f similar therapy with
similar pads, the only other burns

were caused by electrode therapy pads from the same

501659, as the pads Which injured Linda Black. R.

at

205. Bart

therapy in accordance With the Rich-Mar manual. R. at 205.
afﬁdavit, expert testimony, or any other

N0

means was submitted

lot,

McDonald administered

the

admissible evidence through

to the

Court by the

Defendants. Because 0f this, no other reasonable alternative cause can be

shown

for the

burns suffered by Linda Black.
In this case there are

Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief

n0 other probable explanations

for the cause of Plaintiff” s injuries
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outside 0fthe negligence ofDefendants.

S.

H. Kress

&

C0.

v.

Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 617,

515 P.2d 561, 564 (1973). Plaintiff established that there was no alternative cause t0 her
injuries

and the Defendants provided no

facts,

no admissible evidence, and no expert

testimony to challenge those facts put before the Court by afﬁdavit. R.

at

203-206.

Because Defendants were in exclusive control over the manufacturing 0f the faulty
electrode

pad and, Without negligence

in

manufacturing of the electrode pad, no injury would

have occurred, and no other reasonable alternative for Linda Black’s
erred

Plaintiff has

Court

that res ipsa Zoquitur did not apply to this case.

by ruling

Plaintiff’s

4.

injuries exist, the

Prima Facie Case.

shown

to Plaintiff or that there

that

n0 other reasonable secondary causes could have caused the

was any abnormal

injuries

use, eliminating other sources of liability. R. at 204-

205. Defendants proffered no evidence to dispute this fact and were not qualiﬁed as experts

themselves t0 dispute this fact in their

Court

is

decide

required to

all

factual

make

all

or at argument.

On summary judgment,

the

reasonable inferences in favor of the non—moving party and to

and evidentiary disputes in favor of the non-moving party. Sadid v. Idaho State

University, 151 Idaho 932, 938,

Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport

Marek v.

memorandum

265 P.3d 1144, 1150 (201

&

Hecla, Ltd, 161 Idaho 21

1);

Liberty Bankers Life Ins. C0.

v.

T0016, P.S., 159 Idaho 679, 685, 365 P.3d 1033, 1040 (2016);

1,

214, 384 P.3d 975, 978 (2016) (citing

Mackay

Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008)); Callies

Idaho 841, 846, 216 P.3d 130, 135 (2009) (citing Collard
535, 541 (1969)); Banner Life Ins. C0.

v.

v.

v.

Four

O'Neal, 147

Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 795, 451 P.2d

Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable

123-24, 206 P.3d 481, 487-88 (2009); Friel

v.

v.

Tn, 147 Idaho 117,

Boise City Hous. Auth, 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887

P.2d 29, 30 (1994).

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief
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The Court chose

to use

facie case for negligence 0n

its

own standard,

that Plaintiff was required to

summary judgment, and made each

prove her prima

inference in favor of the

Defendants instead of the non-moving party. The Court stated that “The record before the Court
supports a reasonable ﬁnding that there
injury.” R. at 167. There

Plaintiff’s injury outside

is

was a secondary cause

that could

have caused Black’s

nothing in the record which indicates any secondary cause t0

of the defective electro therapy pad. Therefore, there was no basis for

the Court t0 infer any “reasonable ﬁnding” in favor of the Defendants. Defendants did not assert

any grounds

entitling

them

to

judgment

as a matter

of law and there was a

triable issue

of

disputed fact as to the cause of Plaintiff’s burns. Defendants had the burden of proof to

demonstrate that they were entitled to
issue of fact remained for the jury,

Summary Judgment

Which they

as a matter of law

by McDonald through afﬁdavit of counsel on August

10,

11,

29,

at

machine used

different part

0n

Summary Judgment on October

85-99; R. at 157-162. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(A) requires that

written motion, afﬁdavit(s) supporting the motion,

any, and, if a hearing

is

IRCP

memoranda or briefs supporting

“A

the motion, if

requested, the notice of hearing for the motion, must be ﬁled with the

court and served so as to be received
for hearing.”

part, for the

2019 and then a

2019, the day after the Court heard the Motion for

2019. R.

triable

failed to meet.

Defendants further attempted to offer the product manual, in

October

and that no

7(b)(3)(A).

by the

parties at least 14 days prior to the

Under IRCP Rule

afﬁdavit in support of their motion for

7, the

day designated

submission of Defendant’s supplemental

summary judgment was untimely and should not have

been considered by the Court. The Rich-Mar Manual for the machine used by Mr. McDonald
did not

fall

under any of the twelve (12) types of self—authenticating documents under Idaho Rule

of Evidence 902 and could not be submitted Without expert testimony. I.R.E. 902; R.

Plaintiff—Appellant’s Brief

at

157-162.

Page 16

was submitted

Because the manual, in relevant

part,

to its inadmissibility in a timely

manner. The manual

after the hearing, Plaintiff could not object

itself conﬁrms that

the proper settings for the treatment he administered and there

which the Court could
dispute Mr.

infer otherwise or

McDonald’s

statements.

is

Mr. McDonald used

no evidence

in the record

by

any admissible evidence offered by the Defendants

The Court’s conclusion

that there

electrode pads [sic] but also a reasonable possibility of a second cause”

evidence in the record, but was purely speculation by the Court. R.
not excluding the untimely ﬁling of the Rich-Mar

Manual

to

was “abnormal use of the
was not based upon

at 169,

The Court erred by

as an exhibit and as t0

its

inadmissibility under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as well as ﬁnding any secondary cause

of Plaintiff s
5.

injuries.

Conclusion.

The Court applied the

incorrect standards

on summary judgment, considered inadmissible

evidence in decision, and misapplied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Plaintiffprovided

undisputed evidence that there are no reasonable alternative causes to her burns from the
defective electro therapy pads, that there

was no abnormal use of the pads, and

that there are

n0 secondary sources of liability. The Court must reverse the lower Court’s ruling granting

summary judgment in

DATED THIS

favor of the Defendants and

13th

remand

this case for further proceedings.

day of July, 2020.
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